

PSYCHOLOGY AND STRATEGY

adapting their principles of strategy to the exigencies of that fact. Then I have no doubt they would have scoffed at the notion that you must seek the foe at his strongest. Robertson would have become a dogmatic and surly Cadornist, and probably Cadorna would have developed into a diffident and courtly Robertsonian.

It is interesting to note that six months after the Rome Conference, General Sir Ian Hamilton, writing on 17th July, 1917, to Mr. Winston Churchill, advanced quite independently ^{the same} view which I had urged upon my colleagues in Rome. In the course of his letter he said :—

" Is there no other alternative now that it seems too late to hope to do anything in the East? I have racked my brains over the map and I believe that there is one good chance left (apart from the Russians). Were the Italian Army to be suddenly reinforced so that it could press forward northwards in the direction of Vienna, I believe they might break through and give a final shake to the Austrians. The German preparations, entrenchments and railway communications are not sufficiently good to enable them properly to forestall a thrust in that direction. The stupid idea of Trieste should be used as a pretence until the last moment and then entirely given up—it is a purely

political idea and no good as a means
of ending
the War.

My view throughout has been that no
General
should attack his enemy where he is
strongest. He
holds him where he is strongest and
attacks him
where he is weakest. At the present
moment the